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USING INTERNATIONAL LAW MORE EFFECTIVELY
TO SECURE AND ADVANCE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES’
RIGHTS: TOWARDS ENFORCEMENT IN U.S. AND
AUSTRALIAN DOMESTIC COURTS
John D. Smelcer†
Abstract: Over the past three decades, indigenous peoples have effected a
remarkable redefinition of their status and rights under international law, giving rise to an
emerging distinct customary international law of indigenous peoples’ rights. Though that
process is ongoing, the next critical step is enforcing these congealing rights “at home” in
the domestic courts of indigenous peoples’ surrounding nations. Australia and the United
States provide the most difficult and most revealing contexts in which to explore the
possibilities and limitations of this necessary next step. The direct enforcement of the
emerging customary international law of indigenous peoples’ rights is not yet possible in
either context, and may never be. However, the strategic use of this new customary
international law as strongly persuasive authority within Australian and U.S. federal
courts in domestic causes of action is a promising approach. This is because Australian
and U.S. courts have generally become more open to internationally based arguments,
and because international law has a special place in Australian and U.S. federal
indigenous peoples’ jurisprudence. This Comment argues that because this jurisprudence
was itself founded upon principles of international law, newly emergent principles of
international indigenous peoples’ rights law should be received into Australian and U.S.
domestic courts as strongly persuasive authority: they may not provide a cause of action
but they can provide a rule of decision. This process of giving interpretive force to
international indigenous rights law within domestic federal law might be termed “soft”
enforcement of international law. Perhaps the arena in which these principles can most
clearly be seen and implemented is in the protection of indigenous “cultural sovereignty.”
This Comment continues by highlighting the promising movements on this front in both
Australian and U.S. federal courts and how indigenous peoples might utilize principles of
“soft” enforcement to best secure and advance their “cultural sovereignty” rights. These
general recommendations are tested and applied in the final section by revisiting the High
Court of Australia’s recent Kartinyeri v. The Commonwealth decision and the U.S.
Supreme Court’s decision in Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n.

I.

INTRODUCTION

Over the past three decades, indigenous peoples have effected a
remarkable redefinition of their status and rights under international law,
giving rise to a collection of international norms that are highly favorable to
their aspirations.1 But as S. James Anaya has powerfully argued, “[i]t is one
†
Juris Doctor expected in 2006, University of Washington School of Law. The author would like
to thank Professor Robert Anderson and the Editorial and Production Staff of the Pacific Rim Law & Policy
Journal for their assistance throughout the writing process. Any errors or omissions are the author’s own.
1
See FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 5.06[2]-[3] (2005); S. JAMES
ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 56-58, 61-72 (2d ed. 2004); Russell Lawrence
Barsh, Indigenous Peoples in the 1990s: From Object to Subject of International Law?, 7 HARV. HUM.
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thing . . . for international law to incorporate norms concerning indigenous
peoples; it is quite another thing for the norms to take effect in the actual
lives of people.”2 Indeed, meaningful enforcement of these highly favorable
norms at the local level has been elusive.3 International law has proved to be
rather Janus-faced for indigenous peoples: on the one hand international
law’s concern for human rights and the right of all peoples to determine their
own political destinies has been the central underpinning to the assertion of
indigenous peoples’ rights on the international level; on the other hand,
international law’s traditional structure built upon the twin precepts of state
sovereignty and consent—with the resulting corollaries of territorial
integrity, exclusive jurisdiction, and non-intervention in domestic affairs—
has impeded attempts to translate success at the international level to the
domestic and local level.4 As a result, indigenous peoples wishing to secure
and advance their rights are faced with an uninviting choice: they can take
their claims before often hostile domestic courts that do not recognize
favorable existing international law, or they can advance their claims before
more sympathetic but largely toothless international bodies without hope for
resulting enforcement of whatever decree they might win. Put simply, the
important gains achieved at the international level by indigenous peoples
and their advocates must find their way to the local level in order “to take
effect in the actual lives of people.”5 The challenge is to find the most
effective means to make this transition.
This Comment takes up this challenge in the specific contexts of
Australia and the United States, arguing that indigenous peoples in these two
countries should employ the emerging international indigenous rights
jurisprudence as persuasive authority in asserting their claims in domestic
courts. Such “soft” enforcement of international law in the domestic courts
of Australia and the United States is the most promising avenue available for
securing and advancing indigenous peoples’ rights through the international
law principles of both countries. Direct enforcement in the U.S. and
RTS. J. 33, 33-34 (1994). For a careful identification of core aspirations of the international indigenous
peoples’ movement, see ANAYA, supra.
2
ANAYA, supra note 1, at 185.
3
See Note, International Law as an Interpretive Force in Federal Indian Law, 116 HARV. L. REV.
1751, 1751 (2003); COHEN, supra note 1, § 5.06[4][a][ii]-[iii]. See also Anne Bayefsky & Joan Fitzpatrick,
International Human Rights Law in United States Courts: A Comparative Perspective, 14 MICH. J. INT’L L.
1, 2 (1992) (describing American courts’ responses to international human rights claims as “largely, though
not uniformly, disappointing”).
4
S. James Anaya, The Rights of Indigenous Peoples and International Law in Historical and
Contemporary Perspective, 1989 HARV. INDIAN L. SYMP. 191, 191 (1990), reprinted in AMERICAN INDIAN
LAW: NATIVE NATIONS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM – CASES AND MATERIALS 1451 (Robert N. Clinton et al.
eds., 2003).
5
ANAYA, supra note 1, at 185.
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Australia is generally unavailable in the absence of a fully crystallized
customary international law or a binding international treaty schema.
However, because U.S. and Australian indigenous rights jurisprudence was
itself founded upon principles of international law, this jurisprudence should
receive international law as highly persuasive authority.
Part II of this Comment examines the emerging customary
international law of indigenous peoples’ rights, clarifying what has
“crystallized” and what is still in the process of formation. In addition, Part
II identifies and focuses on the “firmest edge” of this emerging
jurisprudence: the right to “cultural sovereignty.” Part III explores the best
methods for enforcing this generally favorable customary international law
for indigenous peoples in the domestic courts of Australia and the United
States. Part III argues that direct enforcement is currently largely
unavailable but that international law should be used as persuasive authority
with interpretive force in domestic courts. In other words, emerging
customary law of indigenous rights may not provide a cause of action in
Australian or U.S. courts, but it can provide a rule of decision. Part IV then
applies these general recommendations to the specific context of cultural
sovereignty, revisiting the High Court of Australia’s recent Kartinyeri v. The
Commonwealth6 decision and the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Lyng v.
Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n.7
II.

EMERGING INTERNATIONAL NORMS ADVANCE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES’
RIGHTS

The last three decades have seen the creation of a powerful new force
in international law: an emerging collection of norms favorable to the
advancement of indigenous peoples’ rights.8 While these new norms have
found expression in both new and already existing international agreements
and declarations, to date there has not been an enactment of a comprehensive
treaty or convention detailing the content and governance of this new
collection of norms.9 In the absence of such an overarching treaty regime,
indigenous persons have had to look to principles of customary international
law to give additional content and binding force to these emerging norms.10
6
7
8
9
10

Kartinyeri v. The Commonwealth (1998) 195 C.L.R. 337.
Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
See COHEN, supra note 1, § 5.06[2]-[3]; ANAYA, supra note 1, at 61-72; Barsh, supra note 1.
See ANAYA, supra note 1.
See COHEN, supra note 1, § 5.06[4][a][ii]; ANAYA, supra note 1, at 194-200.
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The following part of this Comment examines these processes and identifies
and examines two principle aspects of the emerging indigenous rights norms
that have fully crystallized into binding customary international law.
A.

Customary International Law and International Legal Process Can
Provide Binding Norms upon Nations

There are two primary sources of contemporary international law:
international agreements and customary international law.11 Each has the
potential to render international norms binding upon nations. International
agreements consist of various international instruments (treaties,
conventions, etc.) that expressly define standards of behavior between
signatory parties to the instrument.12 Primary examples include the United
Nations Charter13 and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.14
Customary international law, though often given reduced attention
because of its less tangible nature, plays an equally vital role in international
law and legal processes.15 International customary law consists of the
general practices or rules of behavior that states observe and follow out of a
sense of self-perceived legal obligation.16 An example is the prohibition
against torture.17 Customary international law is to be distinguished from
mere comity and courtesy in that nations do not undertake the courtesies that
they extend to other nations out of a sense of legal obligation.18 Unlike
international agreements, customary international law may bind states even
though they have not formally agreed to be bound, unless they clearly and
persistently object to the emerging custom as it develops.19 Customary
international law is thus not necessarily written down, and therefore states
may still be bound by a treaty or convention even though they have not
become signatories to that treaty if the content of the treaty has achieved

11
See Statute of the International Court of Justice Art. 38, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. No.
993, 3 Bevans 1179; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102
(1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
12
See COHEN, supra note 1, § 5.06[1].
13
U.N. Charter.
14
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, 23 U.S.T. 3227,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
15
INTERNATIONAL LAW: NORMS, ACTORS, PROCESS—A PROBLEM-ORIENTED APPROACH 70 (Jeffrey
L. Dunoff et al. eds., 2002).
16
See RESTATEMENT, supra note 11, § 102(2); Bayefsky & Fitzpatrick, supra note 3, at 3.
17
See RESTATEMENT, supra note 11, § 702.
18
See COHEN, supra note 1, § 5.06[1].
19
RESTATEMENT, supra note 11, § 102 cmt. c.
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customary international law status.20 This is a crucial gap-filling function of
international customary law given that international agreements cannot hope
to cover all necessary relations between nations and other subjects of
international law.21 But customary international law is only binding once it
has fully emerged, or “crystallized,” a hard-to-define status achieved only
when a majority of states recognize it as law.22
Evidence of norms that have ripened into fully crystallized rules of
customary international law derives from a number of sources. Fundamental
to proving the existence of a customary international law principle is proof
of state practice and accompanying proof that this state practice was
undertaken out of a sense of legal obligation.23 Examples include official
state documents, submissions to international negotiation or policy bodies,
or other indications of governmental action.24 Additional sources of
evidence for determining what constitutes customary international law
include the judgments and opinions of international judicial and arbitral
tribunals; judgments and opinions of national judicial tribunals; diplomatic
statements; national legislation; treaties between other parties; declarations,
resolutions, or statements of principle; and the writings of scholars
documenting proof of customary international law.25
Although determining what norms have crystallized and achieved the
status of customary international law is often difficult, rules of customary
international law are binding against nations and other subjects of
20
INTERNATIONAL LAW: NORMS, ACTORS, PROCESS—A PROBLEM-ORIENTED APPROACH, supra note
15, at 80.
21
See INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS LAW AND POLICY 56 (Paul B. Stephan et al. eds.,
3d ed. 2004).
22
INTERNATIONAL LAW: NORMS, ACTORS, PROCESS—A PROBLEM-ORIENTED APPROACH, supra note
15. For an example of a domestic court finding a principle of customary international law to be fully
crystallized and therefore dispositive of the matter before it, see the foundational U.S. case, The Paquete
Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700, 708 (1900) (“International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and
administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right depending
upon it are duly presented for their determination. For this purpose, where there is no treaty, and no
controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages of
civilized nations . . . . This review of the precedents and authorities on the subject appears to us abundantly
to demonstrate that at the present day, by the general consent of the civilized nations of the world, and
independently of any express treaty or other public act, it is an established rule of international law,
founded on considerations of humanity to a poor and industrious order of men, and of the mutual
convenience of belligerent States, that coast fishing vessels, with their implements and supplies, cargoes
and crews, unarmed, and honestly pursuing their peaceful calling of catching and bringing in fresh fish, are
exempt from capture as prizes of war.”).
23
See RESTATEMENT, supra note 11, § 103 cmt. a.
24
See id.
25
See RESTATEMENT, supra note 11, § 103(2); Craig Allen, Lecture to International Law Class at the
University of Washington School of Law (Oct. 4, 2004) (copy on file with the Pacific Rim Law & Pol’y
Journal).
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international law both at the international level and frequently in the
domestic courts of the many nations themselves.26 This is true of the United
States and Australia where rules of customary international law are
applicable to certain actions before their respective national courts.27 Thus,
even though Australia and the United States may not be signatories to
certain international agreements governing a particular standard, or even if
there are no international agreements in relation to this standard in the first
place, this does not mean that the domestic courts of Australia and the
United States will ignore this standard.28 Indeed, these courts may, in
particular situations, deem these standards to be persuasive, or perhaps even
fully enforceable,29 as rules of customary international law.30
B.

The Emergence of a Distinct Customary International Law Gives
Favorable Content to Indigenous Peoples’ Rights

Emerging international indigenous rights norms have been
promulgated and articulated through three interrelated and mutually
reinforcing processes: (1) interpretation of existing international law in a
way favorable to indigenous peoples’ aspirations; (2) promulgation of new
international instruments specifically focused on indigenous peoples’ rights;
and (3) successful litigation before international bodies resulting in decisions
that have given further favorable content to indigenous peoples’ rights.31
Indigenous peoples themselves have been at the forefront of these processes,
which explains in large part the relative success obtained.32 In addition,
numerous jurists and commentators have given further content to the body of
emerging indigenous rights norms.33

26

See COHEN, supra note 1, § 5.06[1].
See e.g., Bayefsky & Fitzpatrick, supra note 3, at 3-41 (evaluating when customary international
human rights law may achieve persuasive and direct enforceability in U.S. courts); Michael Legg,
Indigenous Australians and International Law: Racial Discrimination, Genocide and Reparations, 20
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 387, 392-93 (2002).
28
See COHEN, supra note 1, § 5.06[1].
29
See id.
30
The full impact of this reality for the enforceability of indigenous rights norms is explored in
greater detail infra and represents the point of departure for the policy recommendations of this Comment.
But first we turn to an examination of which of these indigenous rights norms have crystallized into
customary international law.
31
See ANAYA, supra note 1, at 61-72.
32
See Note, supra note 3, at 1756.
33
See ANAYA, supra note 1, at 61-72.
27
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Primary Existing International Law Instruments Are Favorably
Interpreted to Support Indigenous Peoples’ Rights

The primary existing international law instruments that have been
favorably reinterpreted to support indigenous peoples’ rights include the
U.N. Charter,34 the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“Universal
Declaration”),35 the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(“ICCPR”),36 the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Racial Discrimination (“ICERD”),37 and the American Declaration of the
Rights and Duties of Man (“American Declaration”).38 The U.N. Charter
established two underlying general principles that serve as the foundation for
much of the content of contemporary indigenous rights discourse:39 the right
of self-determination for all peoples and the duty of all states to promote
human rights, including the right to be free of discrimination on the basis of
race, sex, language, or religion.40 The Universal Declaration and the
American Declaration build on these concepts. Though they are not legally
binding documents,41 they are clear statements of an international consensus
on human rights norms, and as such have been effectively used by
indigenous rights advocates as evidence of customary international law
favorable to indigenous rights claims.42
Indigenous rights advocates have been particularly effective in
employing the ICCPR and the ICERD.43 Article 27 of the ICCPR
guarantees that persons belonging to “ethnic, religious or linguistic
minorities” within a nation “shall not be denied the right, in community with
the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and
34

U.N. Charter, supra note 13.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, December 10, 1948, G.A. Res. 217, reprinted in
INTERNATIONAL LAW SELECTED DOCUMENTS 409 (Barry E. Carter et al. eds., 2003).
36
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, December 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171
(adopted by the U.N. General Assembly at New York on December 16, 1966; entered into force on March
23, 1976; ratified by the U.S. on June 8, 1992) [hereinafter ICCPR], reprinted in INTERNATIONAL LAW
SELECTED DOCUMENTS 415 (Barry E. Carter et al. eds., 2003).
37
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 5 I.L.M. 352
(1966) (done at New York on January 7, 1966; entered into force on January 4, 1969), reprinted in
INTERNATIONAL LAW SELECTED DOCUMENTS 452 (Barry E. Carter et al. eds., 2003).
38
The American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, reprinted in INTER-AMERICAN
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, BASIC DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE INTERAMERICAN SYSTEM 3 (2001).
39
See COHEN, supra note 1, § 5.06[2][a].
40
U.N. Charter, supra note 13.
41
See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
42
See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 883 (2d Cir. 1980). Several decisions in which
indigenous rights’ advocates have effectively utilized these international documents in advancing their
claims are examined in detail infra, Part II.C.
43
See COHEN, supra note 1, § 5.06[2][c]-[d].
35
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practice their own religion, or to use their own language.”44 Article 27 has
been successfully employed by indigenous peoples in various international
fora to limit the intrusions of national government into areas of indigenous
sovereignty.45 Likewise, ICERD’s prohibition on racially detrimental
governmental policies has been used by indigenous rights advocates to
substantially alter offending national government policies.46
2.

Three International Law Instruments Specifically Address
Indigenous Rights

Three central documents that specifically address the rights and place
of indigenous peoples in the world and within their surrounding nation states
have emerged in the last two decades, giving the most specific content to the
emerging body of indigenous rights norms. These are the U.N. Working
Group on Indigenous Population’s (“Working Group”) Draft Declaration of
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (“DDRIP”),47 the International Labour
Organization’s Convention No. 169 of 1989 (“ILO Convention No. 169”),48
and the Organization of American State’s (“OAS”) American Declaration on
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (“ADRIP”).49
Only the ILO Convention No. 169 has actually achieved the status of
enforceable law, and is therefore the single binding international treaty
specifically focused on indigenous rights currently in place in international
44
ICCPR, supra note 36, Art. 27, reprinted in INTERNATIONAL LAW SELECTED DOCUMENTS 415
(Barry E. Carter et al. eds., 2003).
45
See COHEN, supra note 1, § 5.06[2][c] (citing Bernard Ominayak, Chief of the Lubicon Lake Band
v. Canada, Report of the Human Rights Committee, U.N. Doc. A/45/40, vol. II, annex IX (A) (1990)
(concluding that Canada violated Art. 27 of the ICCPR by allowing the government of Alberta to grant
leases for oil and gas exploration within the aboriginal territory of the Lubicon Lake Band); Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights, Report on the Situation of Human Rights of a Segment of the Nicaraguan
Population of Miskito Origin and Resolution on the Friendly Settlement Procedure Regarding the Human
Rights Situation of a Segment of the Nicaraguan Population of Miskito Origin, O.A.S. Doc.
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.62, doc. 10, rev. 3 (1983), OEA/Ser.L/V/II.62, doc. 26 (1984) (Case No. 7964 (Nicaragua)
(concluding that the special legal protection accorded indigenous peoples as a result of Art. 27 extends to
the aspects linked to productive organization, which includes, among other things, the issue of ancestral
and communal lands)).
46
See COHEN, supra note 1, § 5.06[2][c] (citing Mabo v. Queensland (1988) 166 C.L.R. 186, 214-19
(Mabo I) (concluding that a state statute which attempted to eliminate, without compensation, aboriginal
title to lands in the state is inconsistent with provisions of the Racial Discrimination Act of 1975, which
implemented Art. 5 of the ICERD)).
47
Draft United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, E.S.C. Res. 1994/45, U.N.
ESCOR, 46th Sess., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/2/Add.1 (1994).
48
Convention (No. 169) Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, June
27, 1989, Int’l Labour Conference, 28 I.L.M. 1382 (entered into force Sept. 5, 1991).
49
See Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Annual Report of the Commission 1995,
OEA/Ser.L./V./II.91, Doc. 7, Feb. 28, 1996; Osvaldo Kreimer, The Beginnings of the Inter-American
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 9 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 271, 272 & 274 n.7 (1996).
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law.50 ILO Convention No. 169 abandons the ILO’s former assimilationist
posture toward indigenous peoples, and instead affirms indigenous peoples’
aspirations to land and natural resource rights, rights to be free from
discrimination in national social policies, and, most importantly, the right to
cultural integrity.51 The OAS’s ADRIP, which has yet to be fully ratified,
articulates a similar vision for indigenous rights.52 The most aspirational
document, but the one with the most potential to work a fundamental
redefinition of indigenous people’s place in the world, is the U.N. Working
Group’s DDRIP, which goes well beyond Convention No. 169 in its
conception of and solicitude for indigenous rights.53 Taken together, these
documents provide the clearest documentary evidence of the emerging
customary international law of indigenous peoples’ rights.
3.

Decisions from International Fora Bolster Indigenous Peoples’ Rights

Several cases before international fora have provided substantial
content to the emerging collection of international norms regarding
indigenous peoples’ rights. Cases before the Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights and U.N Human Rights Committee have been of
particular significance.54 In general, these cases have probed the central
indigenous rights norms of self-determination, cultural integrity and land
ownership and use issues.55
4.

Academic and Practitioner Delineation of Emerging International
Indigenous Rights Provides Further Recognition

Finally, there have been numerous commentators whose works have
chronicled the emerging international indigenous rights body of norms.
Perhaps the most thorough and poignant commentator has been Professor S.
James Anaya. Professor Anaya’s seminal work, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW, not only chronicles and analyzes these new trends, but
also claims that much of this unruly but quickly growing body of indigenous

50

See COHEN, supra note 1, § 5.06[2][a].
See ANAYA, supra note 1, at 58-60.
52
See Kreimer, supra note 49, at 272, 274 n.7.
53
See ANAYA, supra note 1, at 64-65 (discussing how the DDRIP goes further than the ILO
Convention No. 169).
54
See COHEN, supra note 1, § 5.06[3][a]-[b].
55
See ANAYA, supra note 1, at 110-15, 131-41, 141-48 (examining cases pertaining to each of these
subject areas before both courts). Many of these decisions are examined in detail infra, Part II.C.
51
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rights norms has largely achieved the status of customary international law.56
Professor Anaya’s conclusion may be too sanguine when viewed from the
perspective of national courts.57 Nevertheless, it is clear that even if “the
specific contours of these norms are still evolving and remain somewhat
ambiguous,” customary international law is taking “shape around a certain
consensus of what counts as legitimate in relation to indigenous peoples.”58
C.

The Twin Norms Underlying Cultural Sovereignty: “Internal” SelfDetermination and Cultural Integrity as Customary International Law

Two central, foundational norms underlie the burgeoning body of
international indigenous rights to cultural sovereignty: the right of
indigenous peoples to “internal” self-determination and cultural integrity.59
Arguably these two norms have achieved customary international law status
and represent the firmest edge of this new area of the law.60
1.

“Internal” Self-Determination Is a Means for Indigenous Peoples to
Achieve Greater Self-Management and Autonomy

The generally recognized right of “peoples” to self-determination
must be distinguished from the emerging right of indigenous peoples to
“internal” self-determination.
The right of all “peoples” to selfdetermination is proclaimed in the U.N. Charter61 and other treaties,62 and
most international jurists consider it to be a strong customary norm.63
However, the extent to which this full conception of self-determination
applies to indigenous peoples is still very much in flux.64 Full selfdetermination involves both political freedom and the right of peoples to

56
ANAYA, supra note 1, at 72 (undertaking an exhaustive review of international treaties, tribunal
decisions and submissions of national delegations to international fora before drawing the conclusion that
much of the emerging body of indigenous rights norms has achieved the status of binding customary
international law).
57
See id. For example, his heavy reliance on the developments of international courts will likely
cause domestic courts to view his conclusions with skepticism: after all, international fora often reach
results decidedly divergent from domestic determinations.
58
Id.
59
See id. at 97-128, 131-41.
60
Id. at 112, 137.
61
U.N. Charter, supra note 13, Art. 1.
62
See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 36, Art. 27, reprinted in INTERNATIONAL LAW SELECTED
DOCUMENTS 415 (Barry E. Carter et al. eds., 2003).
63
See Note, supra note 3, at 1757-58.
64
See COHEN, supra note 1, § 5.06[3][a].
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preserve their cultural, ethnic, historical, and territorial identity.65 As such,
full self-determination often brings independent statehood.66 Indeed, the
worry that the right to self-determination allows a people to secede from the
nation-state in which they reside has been the principle road-block to the
extension of self-determination status to indigenous peoples.67 The U.N.
Working Group’s DDRIP is currently stalled on precisely this issue.68
In contrast, a more limited idea of self-determination—a concept that
may be termed “internal” self-determination—has the potential to resolve
this tension.69 The content and nature of “internal” self-determination was
succinctly described by the Australian contribution to the DDRIP
formulation debate: “[Indigenous] peoples are seeking to assert their
identities, to preserve their languages, cultures, and traditions and to achieve
greater self-management and autonomy, free from undue interference from
central governments.”70 In addition, “internal” self-determination should be
seen as a collective or group right as opposed to an individual right.71 And,
as Professor Anaya has persuasively argued, “internal” self-determination
should be seen as sui generis72 to indigenous peoples, as it is remedial in
nature given that it is in some sense a compensation for the specific colonial
encounter experienced by indigenous peoples, an encounter which stripped
them of their most cherished rights wholesale.73
In fact, this seems to be the direction in which negotiations around
DDRIP are headed.74 Both Australia and the United States have signaled
65
See id.; Hurst Hannum, The Right of Self-Determination in the Twenty-First Century: Symposium
on the Future of International Human Rights, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 773, 773-775 (1998).
66
See ANAYA, supra note 1, at 102.
67
See Siegfried Wiessner, Rights and Status of Indigenous Peoples: A Global Comparative and
International Legal Analysis, 12 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 57, 116-20 (1999).
68
See ANAYA, supra note 1, at 110.
69
See id. at 111-12.
70
Australian Government Delegation, Speaking Notes on Self-Determination, at 2 (July 24, 1991).
71
See Kitok v. Sweden, Communication No. 197/1985, Report of the Human Rights Committee,
U.N. GOAR, 43rd Sess., Supp. No. 40, at 207, U.N. Doc. A/43/40, annex 7 (G) (July 27, 1988) (holding
that the group cultural rights of the Sami indigenous peoples in Sweden take precedence over the individual
claim of one of its members when the viability and the welfare of Sami culture was threatened); cf.
Lovelace v. Canada, Communication No. 24/1977, Report of the Human Rights Committee, U.N. GOAR,
36th Sess., Supp. No. 40, at 166, U.N. Doc. A/36/40, annex 18 (July 30, 1981) (upholding the right of the
individual to access their indigenous culture: “the right of Sandra Lovelace to have access to her native
culture and language ‘in community with the other members’ of her group, has in fact been, and continues
to be interfered with . . . .”).
72
“Sui generis” is defined as: “Of its own kind, peculiar, for example, a statutory proceeding for
declaratory judgment, neither legal nor equitable.” BALLENTINE’S LAW DICTIONARY (1969).
73
See ANAYA, supra note 1, at 110. Importantly, Professor Anaya is clear that “internal” selfdetermination should be seen as an inherent right held by indigenous peoples. It is the recognition of this
right that is “compensatory” on the part of the former colonial powers, not the right itself.
74
See id. at 111-12.
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their approval of self-determination language in the DDRIP, but only if it is
to be understood in its more limited “internal” self-determination sense.75
A brief examination of the Miskito Case76 demonstrates the concrete
application and interaction of these principles. In the Miskito Case, the
peoples of the Atlantic coast region of Nicaragua took their longstanding
claim to independence from the central Nicaraguan government to the InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights.77 This case, the sole international
case to directly address whether indigenous peoples qualify for full selfdetermination status, clearly held that they did not.78 However, the second
holding in the Miskito Case can arguably be seen as an endorsement of
“internal” self-determination for the Miskito coast indigenous peoples,
resolving that these peoples deserved autonomy in ruling their own affairs
and demanding a new political order reflecting this principle.79 In short, the
Miskito Case rejected full self-determination for indigenous peoples but
extended to them the right to “internal” self-determination in its place.80
As the foregoing demonstrates, the concept of full self-determination
for indigenous peoples is fraught with irresolvable conflicts of interest and
unlikely to ever materialize as an enforceable right in international law.
Nation-states are simply unwilling to relinquish overall sovereignty within
their existing borders (and most indigenous peoples have not expressed a
strong desire for control over a fully independent nation).81 However, the
concept of “internal” self-determination seems to address concerns on all
sides of the issue: it maintains the territorial integrity and underlying
sovereignty of existing nation states while at the same time ensuring that
indigenous peoples have a palatable measure of control over their own
affairs, natural resources, and culture. In essence, it enables a workable
consensus, and a workable consensus is often the underlying core that
achieves the status of fully binding customary international law. Indeed, as
75

See id.
The Miskito Case, Case 7964, Inter-Am. C.H.R., OEA/Ser.L/V/II.62, doc. 10 rev. 3 (1983);
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.62, doc 26 (1984).
77
See ANAYA, supra note 1, at 114.
78
The Miskito Case, Inter-Am. C.H.R. at 78-81.
79
Id. at 81-82.
80
In a case similar to the Miskito Case, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, in
considering the plight of the Awas Tingni indigenous peoples, further advocated for the extension of
“internal” self-determination to indigenous peoples when it ordered Nicaragua to “create an effective
mechanism for official delimitation, demarcation, and titling of the indigenous communities’ properties, in
accordance with the customary law, values, usage, and customs of these communities.” Case of the
Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Com’ty v. Nicaragua, Case 11.555, Inter-Amer. C.H.R. (ser. C) no. 79
(Aug. 31, 2001), available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/seriecpdf_ing/seriec_79_ing.pdf (last visited Apr.
13, 2005).
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See ANAYA, supra note 1, at 110-111.
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the Miskito Case demonstrates, “internal” self-determination for indigenous
peoples may have already achieved customary international law status.82
2.

Cultural Integrity Has Achieved the Status of Binding Customary
International Law

The right to cultural integrity is fundamentally the right of indigenous
people to assert their identity through the unimpeded use of their own
language, religion, and other distinctive cultural practices.83 A corollary
right is the right of protection for their culturally sacred sites within the
surrounding nation state.84 There is also a remedial flavor to the protection
of indigenous cultural integrity: given the attempts by many nation states to
obliterate indigenous culture through the colonial encounter and continuing
assimilationist policies, they are now under an obligation to protect these
same indigenous cultures.85 This implies that there is an affirmative duty on
the part of nation states to protect indigenous cultural integrity.86 As
Professor Anaya has argued: “[T]he cultural integrity norm has developed
to entitle indigenous groups to affirmative measures to remedy the past
undermining of their cultural survival and to guard against continuing threats
in this regard . . . .”87
Two cases before international fora reinforce these points. In the
Ominayak Case,88 the U.N. Human Rights Committee found that, in light of
“historical inequities,” Canada had violated the Lubicon Lake Band’s right
to cultural integrity under Article 27 of the ICCPR when it allowed the
Province of Alberta to expropriate the tribe’s land for private oil, gas, and
timber exploration.89
In the Yanomami Case,90 the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights also relied on Article 27 of the ICCPR and
held that “international law in its present state . . . recognizes the right of
82

See id. at 112.
However, at the same time, the Human Rights Committee has also instructed that rights of cultural
integrity are not absolute when confronted with the interests of society as a whole. See Lansman v.
Finland, Communication No. 511/1992, Human Rights Committee, 52nd Sess., U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/52/D/511/1992 (Oct. 26, 1994).
84
See Note, supra note 3, at 1760.
85
See ANAYA, supra note 1, at 139.
86
See id.
87
See id.
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Lubicon Lake Band v. Canada, Report of the Human Rights Committee, U.N. Doc. A/45/40, vol.
II, annex IX (A) (Mar. 26, 1990).
89
Id. at ¶ 2.3.
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Yanomami Case, Case No. 7615 (Brazil), Inter-Am. C.H.R., Res. No. 12/85 (Mar. 5, 1985),
Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 1984-1985, O.A.S. Doc.
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.66, doc. 10 rev. 1, at 24 (1985).
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ethnic groups to special protection on their use of their own language, for the
practice of their own religion, and, in general, for all those characteristics
necessary for the preservation of their cultural identity.”91 The Commission
held that the numerous incursions, sanctioned by the Brazilian government,
into the Yanomami ancestral lands threatened the Yanomami’s Article 27protected culture and traditions.92 These two cases underline the affirmative
duty of nations to protect indigenous peoples’ right to cultural integrity and
the role that respect for land rights plays in protecting that right.
The Yanomami decision is of particular significance because Brazil
was not a signatory to the ICCPR at the time of the decision, indicating that
the case’s holding, and the general principle of the right to cultural integrity
for indigenous peoples on which it rests, has achieved the status of
customary international law.93 Supporting this argument is the fact that the
cultural integrity norm is perhaps the norm that has been most consistently
applied to indigenous peoples.94 The cultural rights provisions of the ICCPR
(Art. 27) and ILO Convention No. 169 have both been continuously
referenced and relied upon in international fora to protect indigenous
cultural integrity.95 In addition, the U.N. Working Group’s DDRIP has the
protection of indigenous people’s cultural integrity as one of its central
underlying principles for prospective application.96 Finally, numerous
statements by national governments before various international fora
demonstrate state acceptance of this norm and state recognition of the
obligation to enforce it.97 Taken all together, there is persuasive evidence
that the right of indigenous people to the protection of their cultural integrity
has fully crystallized and achieved the status of binding customary
international law.
As the preceding sections have demonstrated, the twin norms of
cultural integrity and “internal” self-determination have arguably achieved
the status of full customary law in the guise of a right to “cultural
sovereignty.” The enforcement of this crystallizing norm, however, is
decidedly unsettled.98
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Id. at 24, 31.
Id. at 24.
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See ANAYA, supra note 1, at 134.
94
See id. at 131-41.
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See id. at 132-37.
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See Heather S. Archer, Effect of United Nations Draft Declaration on Indigenous Rights on
Current Policies of Member States, 5 J. INTL LEGAL STUD. 205, 206 (1999).
97
See ANAYA, supra note 1, at 137-39.
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ENFORCING THE CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW OF INDIGENOUS
PEOPLES’ RIGHTS

Indigenous peoples have achieved remarkable success at the
international level in creating a body of international norms highly favorable
to the assertion of their rights. At least two of these norms – the right to
“internal” self-determination and the right to cultural integrity – have
arguably crystallized into binding customary international law. And yet,
indigenous peoples have struggled to enforce this customary law at the local
level where it can have the greatest impact in their actual daily lives. This is
particularly true of Australia and the United States, where the recent cases of
Kartinyeri v. The Commonwealth99 and Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery
Protective Ass’n100 demonstrate the resistance of these countries’ domestic
courts to enforcing internationally derived customary law favorable to
indigenous rights when that customary law collides with contrary domestic
law principles. A strategy for effective enforcement at the domestic level of
the hard-won gains achieved by indigenous peoples at the international level
is required. Given the lack of an overarching binding treaty schema
governing indigenous peoples’ rights in international law,101 and given the
large body of highly favorable customary law discussed in Part II, this
section focuses on developing a strategy for the enforcement of customary,
as opposed to treaty-based, international law.
A.

Domestic Enforcement of Indigenous Rights Is Superior to
International Enforcement of Indigenous Rights

The current international legal structure built upon the twin precepts
of state sovereignty and non-intervention in internal state affairs is
inherently resistant to supranational interference within national
boundaries.102 A strategy for enforcing customary international laws of
indigenous peoples’ rights in domestic courts must overcome this inherently
resistant structure.103 There are two choices available to overcome these
99

Kartinyeri v. The Commonwealth (1998) 195 C.L.R. 337.
Lyng v. NW Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
101
Although the ILO Convention No. 169 is technically a treaty, it does not comprehensively govern
national treatment of indigenous peoples. It is also bears emphasis that however comprehensive and
progressive DDRIP may turn out to be, it will not be a binding treaty schema but rather a non-enforceable
declaration under international law.
102
See Anaya, supra note 4, at 191.
103
Id. at 1460. The Dann sisters, Mary and Carrie Dann, unable to adequately prosecute their land
claims in United States’ courts, took their claims to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
100
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systemic barriers to enforcement. One seeks to invade state sovereignty
“from above” by seeking judgments in international fora and then attempting
to enforce these judgments against nation states in domestic courts.104 The
contemporary human rights regime often utilizes this method.105 The second
attempts to gain judgment and enforcement in the domestic courts of the
nation-state itself.106
The first “international option” is plagued by difficulties in gaining
actual enforcement of the judgment107 and sets up an adversarial regime
pitting international bodies against domestic constituencies and
institutions.108 In the absence of a binding treaty schema, such as the World
Trade Organization (“WTO”) structure, domestic pressures are likely to
consistently overwhelm international pressures because domestic branches
of government are more closely accountable to domestic constituencies.109
In addition, few things inspire fiercer resistance to outside pressure in
domestic affairs than the perceived loss of sovereignty that attaches to the
domestic enforcement of international rulings.110 The volatile domestic
reactions to WTO rulings impinging on national sovereignty are powerful
demonstrations of this fact.111 These negative aspects of the “international
option” are especially pronounced when it comes to enforcing indigenous
peoples’ rights, as such enforcement often entails perceived losses by
competing domestic constituencies. The Dann Sisters Case clearly
demonstrates the failings of the “international option” on this front.112
The second “domestic option,” though not without its problems,
presents a much better avenue for indigenous peoples wishing to enforce
favorable international custom at the local level. Though it is often harder
where they received a judgment in their favor. To date, they have been unable to enforce this judgment in
U.S. courts.
104
See ANAYA, supra note 1, at 194-200.
105
See id. at 109-10.
106
See Kathleen M. Kedian, Note, Customary International Law and International Human Rights
Litigation in United States Courts: Revitalizing the Legacy of the Paquete Habana, 40 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1395, 1400 (1999); see also Mary Ellen O’Connell, Enforcement and the Success of International
Environmental Law, 3 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 47 (1995) (arguing, among other things, that the future
of successful environmental law enforcement resides in enforcing internationally derived principles in
domestic courts).
107
See O’Connell, supra note 106, at 59-62.
108
See Lea Brilmayer, International Law in American Courts: A Modest Proposal, 100 YALE L.J.
2277 (1991).
109
See THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE LEXUS AND THE OLIVE TREE (2000).
110
See Steel Supporters Warn of Backlash if WTO Upholds Ruling, NATIONAL JOURNAL'S CONGRESS
DAILY, Oct. 14, 2003.
111
See Helene Cooper, Waves of Protest Disrupt WTO Meeting, WALL ST. J., Dec. 1, 1999, at A2.
112
See Mary Dann and Carrie Dann v. United States, Case 11.140, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No.
75/02, OEA/ser. L/V/II.106, doc. 3 rev. at 286 (2002).
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for indigenous peoples to win favorable judgments in domestic fora,113 the
benefits of using domestic courts over international fora are readily apparent.
By choosing domestic courts to advance their claims, indigenous peoples
involve the domestic court as a participant in resolving the dispute.114 This,
in turn, alleviates the perception that judgments are being imposed from the
outside, significantly ameliorating possible domestic nationalist resistance to
enforcement. In addition, the domestic option involves the domestic courts
in the process of developing precepts of emerging international law.115 This
further reduces tension and contradicts the perception that international law
is created by outsiders beyond the control of any domestic interests.116 As
well, the involvement of domestic courts in the resolution of indigenous
rights claims accelerates the process of “norm internalization” whereby
domestic actors begin to align their actions with prevailing international
norms – in this case, indigenous rights norms – because they themselves
have come to believe in them.117 Full norm internalization represents total
enforcement of a given norm and would represent the best possible
outcome.118 Notably, the process of norm internalization is advanced even
when a party to a case loses that specific case. As long as that party asserts
their desired norm, the process of norm internalization is advanced simply
through exposure in the domestic courts. Finally, domestic courts have the
direct power to enforce their own decrees, in contrast to the international
fora available to indigenous peoples wishing to advance their rights.119
In sum, the “domestic option” is the best avenue for indigenous
peoples wishing to secure and advance their claims if they are able to
convince domestic courts to employ the highly favorable body of emerging
customary law discussed in Part II. This is a big “if” and has dissuaded
many indigenous peoples from choosing this option.120 The most effective
way to get domestic courts to apply this favorable indigenous rights
customary law is the subject of the following two sections.
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See Part III.B, infra.
Karen Knop, Here and There: International Law in Domestic Courts, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. &
POL’Y 501, 535 (2000).
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Id. at 535.
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Id. at 535.
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(1999).
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Id. at 1407.
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Direct Enforcement of Customary International Law in Australian
and U.S. Courts Is Alluring, but Ultimately Frustrating

Direct enforcement of customary international law in the domestic
courts of Australia and the United States appears on first glance to be quite
alluring.121 For instance, in U.S. courts customary international law is
considered federal common law and is enforceable to the same extent as all
other federal common law.122 Subsequent acts of Congress must be
construed so as not to conflict with customary law,123 and, as federal
common law, customary international law is meant to preempt any
conflicting state law.124
A similar situation exists in Australia. Although there is much less
case law on the subject than in the United States, the recent Mabo v.
Queensland125 and Nulyarimma v. Thompson126 Australian High Court
decisions establish in dicta that customary international law is part of the
Australian common law with similar resulting implications.127
However, the potential negatives of directly enforcing customary law
in Australian and U.S. courts overwhelm the potential positives of
employing such a strategy and demonstrate that another method for
enforcing indigenous rights customary law must be formulated. First of all,
the threshold for what rules of customary international law may be directly
enforced in domestic courts is strict: only norms that have achieved fully
crystallized customary international law status will qualify.128 This
eliminates many indigenous rights norms that have yet to achieve this status.
This underlines a second major constraint in attempting to directly
enforce international customary law in domestic courts: what has attained
the status of a fully crystallized rule of customary law is decidedly difficult
to determine.129 Because U.S. and Australian domestic courts are already
predisposed against recognizing indigenous peoples’ claims, such
121
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indeterminacy is too easily exploited to preclude application of “close”
customary norms.
Thirdly, because of the persistent objector exception to the
enforcement of customary international law, rules of customary law
consistently disputed by the United States or Australia may not be applied
by their respective courts.130
Finally, and perhaps most dispositive of this debate, even if there is a
clear rule of binding customary international law, this rule may not provide a
cause of action in U.S.131 or Australian132 domestic courts. Instead,
international custom may only provide a rule of decision that U.S.133 or
Australian134 courts can apply when a cause of action comes before the court
from some other source.135
Direct enforcement of indigenous customary international law rights
in the domestic courts of Australia and the U.S. is alluring, but ultimately
likely to be a frustrating option. If such an option is available, indigenous
peoples and their advocates should seize the opportunity, as it provides for
robust enforcement and advancement of indigenous rights. However, as
demonstrated above, such opportunities are likely to be minimal. That
leaves a final method for the enforcement of highly favorable indigenous
peoples’ rights customary international law: “soft” enforcement of
customary international law.
C.

“Soft” Enforcement of Customary International Law Acts as an
Interpretive Guide in Australian and U.S. Courts

Even when customary international law rules cannot be directly
enforced in domestic courts, they can still have a powerful impact on the
130
See THOMAS BUERGENTHAL & HAROLD G. MAIER, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A NUTSHELL
24 (1985) (defining the “persistent objector exception” as the ability of countries that have consistently
refused to apply an emerging principle of customary international law to subsequently refuse to enforce that
rule when it has fully crystallized and is mandatorily enforceable against all other countries who have not
themselves persistently objected to its enforcement in their territory).
131
See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 819 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring);
see also Sosa, 542 U.S. at 723 (2004) (holding that neither the Federal Tort Claims Act nor the Alien Tort
Statute provided a remedy for a Mexican alien unlawfully abducted from Mexico and arrested in the United
States).
132
See Mitchell, supra note 127, at 32 (describing the international crime of genocide, and
considering Australia's response to its international obligations regarding genocide in the context of its
implementation of international human rights generally, and in light of Nulyarimma v. Thompson
specifically).
133
See Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 819 (Bork, J., concurring); Sosa, 542 U.S. at 723 (2004).
134
See Mitchell, supra note 127, at 32.
135
This will be further addressed in Part III.C, infra.
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shape of domestic law and can achieve a degree of enforcement in the daily
lives of indigenous peoples at the local level. This is because the emerging
body of international indigenous rights customary rules can still be “softly”
enforced in domestic courts; that is, they can be used as persuasive authority
and as an interpretive guide in matters before these courts.136 In other
words, instead of providing a cause of action, indigenous rights norms can
provide a rule of decision in Australian and U.S. courts.137 Additionally,
given that indigenous peoples’ law in Australia and the United States was
itself founded on principles of international law, Australian and U.S.
domestic courts should be required to consider contemporary international
law regarding indigenous peoples in reaching decisions affecting indigenous
peoples within their borders.138 Finally, given that Australian and U.S.
domestic courts have recently demonstrated a willingness to consider
international and comparative law principles in reaching their own domestic
decisions139 despite earlier reluctance, the time is right for indigenous
peoples to advance their claims through “soft” enforcement of favorable
international custom.
1.

Australian and U.S. Courts Are Increasingly Open to International
Precedent

The highest courts of both Australia and the United States have
recently demonstrated a willingness to consider precedent from beyond their
respective borders as persuasive authority and as a guide to interpreting their
own domestic law.140 For example, the Mabo v. Queensland decision in
Australia cited decisions from the United States, Canada, and New Zealand,
as well as principles of international law.141 The U.S. Supreme Court’s
recent decision in Roper v. Simmons likewise cited both comparative and
international law as persuasive authority in deciding that the execution of
136

See Bayefsky & Fitzpatrick, supra note 3, at 23-27; COHEN, supra note 1, § 5.06[4][a][iii].
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juveniles is unconstitutional.142 This posture toward persuasive authority
originating beyond the domestic borders of Australia and the United States
opens the door to employing the “soft” enforcement strategy for
internationally derived indigenous rights norms discussed in the next
section.
2.

Indigenous Rights Customary International Law Should Be Used as
Persuasive Authority and as an Interpretive Guide in Australian and
U.S. Domestic Courts

In common law systems such as Australia and the United States,
international customary law can and should provide a logical framework of
principles for indigenous rights. In both countries, the judiciary has been
active in both interpreting statutory or constitutional law concerning
indigenous peoples and in developing supplemental (if not foundational)
legal doctrine in the common law tradition.143 This is especially true where
the issue of indigenous law before those courts is indeterminate.144 In such
cases, international customary law should be used as highly persuasive
authority.145
In the United States, such a structure is enabled by the already
established statutory interpretive rule that federal law should comport with
international law norms wherever possible146 and by the resulting reliance of
U.S. courts upon international law norms in interpreting state and federal
statutes and constitutional provisions.147 In Australia, this approach to using
international indigenous rights norms is more fully developed and
exemplified by the recent Mabo v. Queensland decision.148 Justice Brennan,
in announcing the leading opinion of the court, stated: “The common law
does not necessarily conform with international law, but international law is
a legitimate and important influence on the development of the common law

142
See Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1197-1200 (2005); see also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S.
558 (2002) (referring to European Court of Human Rights decisions and laws of other nations regarding
sodomy laws); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 830-31 (1988) (referring to the capital punishment
laws of the United Kingdom, New Zealand, Australia, former West Germany, France, Portugal, the
Netherlands, Italy, Spain, Switzerland, former Soviet Union, and Scandinavian countries).
143
See ANAYA, supra note 1, at 197.
144
See Note, supra note 3, at 1751.
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See id. at 1751; Frickey, supra note 138, at 74-75.
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especially when international law declares the existence of universal human
rights.”149
In sum, emerging indigenous rights customary international law may
not provide a cause of action for indigenous peoples’ claims before domestic
courts or prove to be binding authority in these courts’ determinations.
Nevertheless, it can provide interpretive guidance as persuasive authority
thereby providing a rule of decision to domestic courts. This, in turn, can
have a profound impact on domestic law, establishing key principles and
adding content to domestic law based upon international principles favorable
to indigenous peoples, and thereby translating these principles to the local
level and to daily lives.
3.

Consideration of Indigenous Rights Customary International Law by
the Domestic Courts of Australia and the United States Is Not Merely
Advisable, it Should Be Required Under Court Precedent

Despite the objections of some U.S. and Australian jurists, principles
of international law should be particularly persuasive in these domestic
courts because indigenous law in these countries originates from principles
of international law.150
The Marshall trilogy151 of cases establishing the guiding principles of
American Indian law in the United States introduced twin foundational
concepts to this jurisprudence: American Indian tribes were deemed to be
“domestic dependent nations” with “inherent sovereignty.”152 In essence,
this meant that tribes lacked most attributes of “external” sovereignty but
retained the authority to govern their own internal affairs and territory.153 It
149
150

Id. at 41-42 (Brennan, J.).
See Frickey, supra note 138, at 74-75; Saito, supra note 138, at 432-33; ANAYA, supra note 1, at

195.
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See Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 17; Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 559-61.
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See, e.g., Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 55-56 (1978) (clarifying and reaffirming
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limit this power); Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 384 (1896) (stipulating that the Cherokee Nation is a
separate limited sovereign as it existed as a sovereign and government prior to the U.S. government). But
see Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981) (holding that American Indian tribes lack inherent
power to regulate hunting and fishing by non-Indians on non-Indian-owned land within their reservation, at
least where there has been no showing that tribal interests were affected); Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520
U.S. 438 (1997) (reinforcing the Montana holding and further limiting the ways in which one may make a
showing that tribal interests are affected); Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645 (2001) (holding
that an American Indian Tribe lacked regulatory authority to tax a non-Indian hotelier on non-Indianowned land within their reservation and further limiting the scope of tribal interests being affected); Nevada
v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001) (holding that an American Indian Tribe lacked legislative and adjudicative
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implied a relationship governed at least partially by principles of
international law.154 Indeed, “treaties” were employed and American
Indians were consistently treated as different in kind to other peoples on the
American continent, for better and for worse.155 Accompanying less
favorable doctrines also emerged to justify the displacement and subjugation
of American Indians.156 Indeed, these doctrines have largely gained
ascendancy especially under recent Supreme Court rulings; but the
international law-based principles remain a fundamental part of doctrinal
American Indian law.157
Likewise, Australian Aboriginal law is also based in significant part
on principles of international law.158 The international law that existed at the
time of the onset of colonialism in Australia recognized three effective ways
for acquiring sovereignty over territory: (1) conquest, (2) cession, and (3)
occupation of territory that was terra nullius (uninhabited territory belonging
to no one).159 In an amazing denial of reality, Australia was considered an
occupation of terra nullius by its own government and courts.160 Of course,
this meant that for much of Australia’s history, its indigenous peoples were
not treated as limited sovereigns under Australian law, as was the case in the
United States.161 Therefore, principles of international law were not
employed in deriving their relationship to the emerging Australian nation.162
However, this all changed with Mabo v. Queensland,163 a decision from
Australia’s highest court that signaled a seismic shift in Australia’s approach
to its indigenous peoples.164 Among other things, the Mabo decision, in
authority to reach a claim against the on-reservation actions of State law enforcement officers who entered
the Indian reservation to investigate an off-reservation crime). Cf. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193
(2004) (recognizing and reaffirming that American Indian tribes hold inherent sovereignty over their
internal affairs: the American Indian tribe in this case was to be recognized as an independent though
limited sovereign from the U.S. government for purposes of double jeopardy determinations).
154
See AMERICAN INDIAN LAW: NATIVE NATIONS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM—CASES AND
MATERIALS 1450 (Robert N. Clinton et al. eds., 2003).
155
See generally ENDURING LEGACIES: NATIVE AMERICAN TREATIES AND CONTEMPORARY
CONTROVERSIES (Bruce E. Johansen, ed., 2004) (examining and reevaluating the role and effect of treaties
in the colonial encounter between American Indians and Euro-American settlers).
156
Namely, the plenary power and the trust doctrines.
157
See Note, supra note 3, at 1753-54; Frickey, supra note 138, at 74-75.
158
Legg, supra note 27, at 402.
159
See id.
160
See id; Mabo v. Queensland (1992) 175 C.L.R. 1, 37-38.
161
See Karen E. Bravo, Balancing Indigenous Rights to Land and the Demands of Economic
Development: Lessons from the United States and Australia, 30 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 529, 549-50
(1997).
162
See id. at 549-52.
163
Mabo v. Queensland (1992) 175 C.L.R. 1.
164
See Bravo, supra note 161, at 553 (“Mabo v. Queensland . . . created a seismic upheaval in the
legal landscape of Australia.”).
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holding that Australian indigenous peoples did retain “native” title to their
lands except where extinguished by the Crown, soundly rejected the terra
nullius conceptualization.165 By doing this the Australian High Court
essentially opened the door to developing a new relationship between the
Australian government and indigenous peoples, finally recognizing the
sovereignty of these peoples.166 Crucially, the Mabo opinion utilized
international law to both open this door and to establish the first
foundational principles that would govern this new conceptualization.167 In
sum, though Australia and the United States have taken different pathways,
both countries have arrived at a formulation of domestic indigenous peoples’
law that was created and is fundamentally based upon principles of
international law.
Given that indigenous peoples’ law in both Australia and the United
States has its origins in international law, contemporary principles of
international law should have particularly persuasive power in Australian
and U.S. courts applying this jurisprudence today. As Philip P. Frickey
argues in the context of U.S. law, “[i]f the only legitimate constitutional
justification for an expansive federal power over Indian affairs lies in
interpreting the Constitution against the backdrop of international law, then
international law is an important framework for constitutional interpretation
throughout the field of federal Indian law.”168
This does not mean that international law should be binding authority
in U.S. and Australian courts adjudicating indigenous rights’ claims.169
However, it does mean that international customary law of indigenous rights
has a special place in U.S. and Australian domestic courts. Specifically it
should be mandatorily considered in U.S. and Australian courts as
persuasive authority and as an equally valid source of law even when
international precedent would not be considered in other similarly postured
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See Mabo, 175 C.L.R. at 41-42.
See Benedict Kingsbury, Reconciling Five Competing Conceptual Structures of Indigenous
Peoples’ Claims in International and Comparative Law, 34 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 189, 195 (2001).
167
Wiessner, supra note 67, at 72; see also Legg, supra note 27, at 402-03 (discussing Justice
Brennan’s reliance on the International Court of Justice’s Advisory Opinion on Western Sahara as key
precedent for reaching his holding).
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Frickey, supra note 138, at 74.
169
Professor Frickey is clear on this: “My theory does not ask American courts to enforce
international human rights norms directly as a matter of domestic law. Instead, at first glance it is similar to
the theory, propounded by many scholars, that these norms should provide an interpretive backdrop for our
understanding of domestic law, especially the potentially expansive constitutional clauses protecting human
rights. The crucial difference is, however, that my theory expressly links one area of international human
rights—that involving indigenous peoples—directly to the Constitution, rather than viewing it as merely a
universal normative backdrop.” Frickey, supra note 138, at 77-78.
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non-indigenous rights contexts.170 This conclusion is based on the quid pro
quo that Professor Frickey argues is required: if Australian and U.S.
domestic indigenous peoples’ law is built upon principles of international
law, then international law should continue to inform new developments in
this jurisprudence.171
Australia and the United States present the toughest and most
revealing contexts in which to probe the nature and limits of enforcing
international customary law of indigenous peoples’ rights.
Direct
enforcement of emerging international indigenous rights norms is highly
unlikely in both contexts. This is true even of indigenous rights norms that
have fully crystallized into binding rules of customary international law.
However, even in these resistant jurisdictions, international law can be
“softly” enforced at the domestic level by using emerging indigenous rights
international customary law as persuasive authority, thereby providing not a
cause of action, but a rule of decision for domestic courts. In this way,
“soft” enforcement is able to realize most of the benefits of direct
enforcement in the actual lives of indigenous peoples on-the-ground. It also
allows for the use of indigenous rights norms before domestic courts that
have not fully congealed into customary law, thereby expanding the amount
of favorable precedent available to indigenous rights litigators. Finally,
utilizing a soft-enforcement strategy helps to crystallize still emerging
indigenous rights norms reinforcing and accelerating the growth of this
highly favorable international precedent.172
IV.

APPLYING THE PRINCIPLES OF “SOFT” ENFORCEMENT OF
INTERNATIONAL CUSTOMARY INDIGENOUS RIGHTS ENABLES
RECONSIDERATION OF LYNG AND KARTINYERI

Two recent judicial decisions from Australia and the United States,
Kartinyeri v. The Commonwealth173 and Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery
Protective Association,174 provide an opportunity to evaluate the principle of
“soft” enforcement as applied to the twin norms of cultural sovereignty:
cultural integrity and “internal” self-determination.
170
See id. at 79 (“[e]ven if the courts will not look to those rights to inform every question of
domestic law involving human rights, such as free speech or inhumane punishment, in federal Indian law
cases the courts are compelled to consider international law.”).
171
See id.
172
See Koh, supra note 117, at 1407.
173
Kartinyeri v. The Commonwealth (1998) 195 C.L.R. 337.
174
Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
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A.
Kartinyeri v. The Commonwealth Would Have Been Decided
Differently If the Emerging International Customary Law of Indigenous
Peoples’ Rights Had Been Considered
In Kartinyeri, a group of the indigenous Ngarrindjeri people sought to
prevent the construction of a bridge—the Hindmarsh Island bridge—that
they claimed would devastate a sacred area of cultural and spiritual
importance to them.175 The Ngarrindjeri invoked the Aboriginal and Torres
Strait Island Heritage Protection Act of 1984 (Cth)176 to protect this sacred
site, which gave the relevant Minister power to make and enforce
declarations meant to protect and preserve sensitive Aboriginal sites and
objects.177 The Heritage Protection Act was in conflict with another act,
however, the Hindmarsh Island Bridge Act of 1997,178 which prevented the
Minister from declaring any Aboriginal areas surrounding the bridge
construction site as sacred areas.179 The question presented to the Australian
High Court was which act would control, and specifically whether the
Bridge Act was invalid because it was not supported by any constitutionally
enumerated power.180 The Court held that passage of the Bridge Act, and its
resulting significant amendment of the Heritage Protection Act, was a valid
exercise of power.181 According to the lead opinion, because the Parliament
had the power to enact the Heritage Protection Act, it also had the power to
amend and diminish the act: “the power to make laws includes the power to
unmake them . . . .”182
The central issue underpinning the dilemma before the Court was
whether § 51(xxxvi) of the Australian Constitution183—colloquially referred
to as the “race power”184—allowed race-based legislation that was
disadvantageous to targeted groups or only provided for beneficial
175

See Kartinyeri, 195 C.L.R. at 349-50.
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Island Heritage Protection Act 1984, Cth (Austl.) [hereinafter
Heritage Protection Act].
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See Kartinyeri, 195 C.L.R. at 349-50; Legg, supra note 27, at 395.
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Hindmarsh Island Bridge Act 1997 (Austl.) [hereinafter Bridge Act].
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See Kartinyeri, 195 C.L.R. at 349-50; Legg, supra note 27, at 395.
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See id. at 340.
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See id. at 355.
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See id.
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AUSTL. CONST., Ch. 1, § 51(xxxvi). The race power stipulates that Parliament has the power to
pass laws with respect to: “The people of any race, other than the aboriginal race in any State, for whom it
is deemed necessary to make special laws.” In 1967, Australia passed a referendum voted on directly by its
population which amended § 51(xxvi) by deleting the phrase: “other than the aboriginal race in any State.”
See Legg, supra note 27, at 393-94.
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legislation towards those groups.185 This issue had not been squarely
considered by the court before.186 A majority of the court found that the race
power was broad enough to authorize laws that operate either to the
advantage or disadvantage of people of the particular targeted race.187 A
slimmer majority went on to hold that this broad power controlled the issue
before the court, and that the Bridge Act could constitutionally operate to the
detriment of the Ngarrindjeri people.188 One opinion agreed with the broad
reading of the race power,189 but argued that as applied to this situation, only
a beneficial law would be “necessary” under the language of the race power
clause.190 Justice Kirby, in dissent, argued that a 1967 amendment to the
race power clause effectively created a gloss on this amendment that allowed
only beneficial race-based legislation.191 Justice Kirby went on to state that,
where the Constitution is ambiguous, the Court should adopt a meaning that
conforms to principles of universal rights and that international law is a
legitimate and persuasive source for determining these controlling universal
principles.192 Justice Kirby then looked to principles of international law
that prohibit detrimental distinctions on the basis of race to support his
constitutional interpretation.193
Kartinyeri could have been decided differently by utilizing
international customary law regarding indigenous peoples as persuasive
authority in resolving the constitutional indeterminacy at the core of the
case. As Justice Kirby recognized, using principles of international law to
resolve indeterminacy is a valid and effective approach to constitutional
interpretation.194 Thus, the emerging customary international law of
indigenous peoples’ rights can be brought to bear in resolving this
indeterminacy. And, as this Comment has argued, not only can it be brought
to bear, it should be brought to bear given the unique foundational role that
international law has played in formulating the law of indigenous peoples in
both Australia and the United States. Unfortunately, no Justice in Kartinyeri
looked to the customary international law of indigenous peoples rights.195
185
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If the Kartinyeri Justices had considered this emerging customary law,
Kartinyeri would have been decided differently. First, the congealing
customary law of “internal” self-determination for indigenous peoples would
have prohibited the Bridge Act from curtailing certain provisions of the
Heritage Protection Act that extended such internal self-determination to the
Ngarrindjeri people. Such a provision was at the heart of this case: the right
to aboriginal control over land that is considered to be a sacred site by the
Ngarrindjeri. In other words, at the most general level of analysis the
“internal” self-determination would have resolved the indeterminacy of
which act controlled in favor of the Heritage Protection Act because this act
supported the “internal” self-determination norm, whereas the Bridge Act
undermined it. As well, the constitutional indeterminacy of whether the race
power could be applied only in an advantageous way would have been
resolved in favor of an exclusively advantageous reading, because such a
reading would have been consistent with the emerging international custom
of maintaining “internal” self-determination for the Ngarrindjeri people. A
contrary reading would have directly undermined this “internal” selfdetermination. Second, the norm of cultural integrity for indigenous peoples
would have counseled for a constitutional reading of the race power
forbidding legislation which disadvantaged aboriginal people by removing
their access to territory considered sacred by them. Though no justice took
this approach to deciding the case, it is encouraging that at least one
justice—Justice Kirby—recognized the validity of using principles of
international law to resolve indeterminacy in local law.196 This is a positive
sign that at least some members of the Australian High Court are open to
“soft” enforcement of internationally derived indigenous rights.
B.

Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association Would
Have Been Decided Differently If the Emerging Customary
International Law of Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Had Been
Considered

In Lyng, American Indian plaintiffs challenged a proposal by the U.S.
Forest Service to build a road on public land in the Chimney Rock area of
Northern California on the grounds that this road would destroy a sacred
area essential to the practice of their religion, and one that the Indians had
been using for generations.197 The district court held that the road-building
196
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and the timbering that the road was being built for “would seriously damage
the salient visual, aural, and environmental qualities of the high country”
necessary for the practice of the Indian’s religion and therefore would
violate the Free Exercise Clause of the U.S. Constitution.198 The Ninth
Circuit agreed.199 Justice O’Connor, writing for the majority of the Supreme
Court, rejected the argument that the Indians’ right to religious freedom
under the First Amendment was infringed by the road construction.200
Justice O’Connor argued that American Indians have exactly the same First
Amendment Free Exercise rights as everyone else,201 and that these rights do
not include the ability to exert control over federal public lands.202
As in the Kartinyeri case, principles of customary international law of
indigenous peoples’ rights, utilized as highly persuasive authority, would
have counseled for a different outcome in Lyng. “Soft” enforcement of these
indigenous peoples’ rights would have entailed the application of this
customary law as a highly persuasive interpretive guide in determining the
content of the Free Exercise Clause in relation to American Indians. First,
the internationally derived “internal” self determination principle would
have attacked the idea that American Indians’ religious rights are on equal
footing with other religions in the United States. The specific history giving
content to the uniqueness of “internal” self determination would have itself
pointed to a conclusion that recognized that American Indians should be
accorded an extra measure of deference in determining what constitutes their
religious practices and what is needed to sustain these practices. This
deference is due because of the unique limited sovereignty—termed
“internal” self determination—accorded to indigenous peoples under
international law, and indeed under U.S. law.
Secondly, the internationally derived principle of cultural integrity
would have reinforced this deference and would have attacked the Supreme
Court’s conclusion that the Indian’s religious practice in this case wasn’t
specifically burdened by the proposed road construction. Application of the
cultural integrity norm would compel the recognition that American Indian
religious beliefs and practices cannot be divorced from the land on which
they are practiced.203 Unlike a Christian church which may be physically
moved or rebuilt without irreparably damaging the core beliefs of the
198
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churchgoers, destruction of American Indian sacred land itself destroys the
underlying spirit and core of American Indian religion.204 Taken together,
the “internal” self determination and cultural integrity principles would have
strongly supported a different outcome to the Lyng decision—one that would
have recognized that the Indian’s First Amendment religious expression
rights were violated by the road construction through their sacred lands.
Lyng and Kartinyeri demonstrate the potential for “soft” enforcement.
Such “soft” enforcement of the emerging customary international law of
indigenous peoples’ rights can lead to the overturning of previously adverse
court decisions and instead, secure and advance indigenous peoples’ rights.
V.

CONCLUSION

Utilizing customary international indigenous rights law as an
interpretive force in federal law (acting as highly persuasive authority) is the
most effective approach currently open to indigenous peoples in the United
States and Australia wishing to use international law to advance their rights.
This approach is effective while a more robust customary international law
for indigenous peoples’ rights fully develops and until an international treaty
schema can be put into place. In the meantime, “soft” enforcement of
emerging customary international law principles—especially the ones that
have most crystallized, such as the right to cultural integrity and “internal”
self determination—has the most realistic potential “to take effect in the
actual lives of [indigenous] people.”205
In fact, sustained use by indigenous peoples of international legal
precedent derived from the emerging international indigenous rights’ norms
not only serves to secure rights for indigenous peoples in the United States
and Australia on a case by case basis; it also serves to accelerate and further
crystallize emerging customary law and the creation of an international
comprehensive and binding treaty governing the rights of indigenous
peoples worldwide.
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